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Interpellation, Resonance, Impediment

The A2R Triad Applied to Six Themes from the Phenomenology Seminar at Lyon 3

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General Introduction

The Mahoukou Law Confronting the Phenomenological Tradition

I. Origin and Context of This Volume

The six academic notes gathered in this volume were born of an encounter — between a tradition and a law. The tradition is that of phenomenology, as it is transmitted and debated in master’s seminars in philosophy, and as it was worked through, during the academic year 2024–2025, within the Master’s Seminar of the Université Jean Moulin — Lyon 3. The themes that seminar placed on its agenda — aesthetics, the Husserlian ambivalences, environmental humanism, social time, the debate on universals, captivity — constitute so many testing grounds on which the phenomenological tradition deployed its most rigorous resources and revealed its deepest limits.

The law is the Phenomenological Law of Interpellation, known as the Mahoukou Law — an eidetic structure formalized in three constitutive and irreducible moments: the Call, the Response, the Resonance (A2R triad). This law does not present itself as one theory among others in the phenomenological field. It claims the status of a law in the strict sense: an eidetic necessity that free variation confirms across all domains of interpellative experience, and whose validity imposes itself on any phenomenology of authentic encounter between subjects.

This volume is the result of the systematic confrontation of these two realities. For each of the six seminar themes, the same question was posed with the same rigor: what does the canonical phenomenological tradition say on this theme — and what does the Mahoukou Law allow us to add, clarify, or correct? This double movement — faithful exposition of the canonical treatment, then the specific contribution of the A2R triad — structures each of the six notes and constitutes the method proper to this volume.

II. What the Six Notes Reveal Together

Read separately, each note constitutes an autonomous contribution to its thematic field. Read together, the six notes reveal something that surpasses the sum of their parts: the coherence and heuristic power of the Mahoukou Law as a transversal tool of phenomenological analysis.

A first thread runs through the whole: the recurrence of the diagnosis of structural lacuna. In each of the six fields explored, the phenomenological tradition proves to be a bearer of considerable resources — and simultaneously incapable, from within its own categories, of reaching the complete formalization of what it senses. Husserl thinks consciousness without the Call of the other (Note 2). The phenomenology of aesthetics describes the encounter with the artwork without formalizing its triadic structure (Note 1). Environmental phenomenologists name the animation of the natural milieu without being able to turn it into an ontology of the Call (Note 3). Rosa diagnoses temporal alienation without reaching its interpellative structure (Note 4). Husserlian formal ontology develops a theory of dependencies without applying it to intersubjective events (Note 5). The phenomenology of captivity describes the destruction of existence without possessing a unified conceptual architecture for ordering its forms (Note 6).

A second thread runs through the whole: the critical fertility of the notion of dialogal impediment. This category — designating all that which, in social, institutional, technological, or existential structures, blocks one of the three moments of the triad — has proved remarkably productive in domains that nothing seemed to predispose to this type of analysis. Timed cultural consumption as impediment to aesthetic Resonance (Note 1). The Husserlian epoché itself as a methodological bracketing of the Call (Note 2). The ecological crisis as planetary-scale dialogal impediment (Note 3). Social acceleration as destruction of the temporal conditions of interpellation (Note 4). Radical captivity as absolute dialogal impediment (Note 6).

A third thread links the six notes through the category of deferred Resonance. Across the aesthetic, temporal, ecological, and clinico-political domains, authentic Resonance proves to be by nature a phenomenon that does not give itself in the immediacy of the exchange, but inscribes itself in duration. This structure of resonant *déferrance* constitutes one of the most original contributions of the Mahoukou Law to contemporary phenomenology.

III. The Mahoukou Law and the Phenomenological Tradition: A Relation of Critical Filiation

The nature of the relation that the Mahoukou Law maintains with the phenomenological tradition from which it issues requires clarification. This relation is not one of rupture — the Mahoukou Law does not present itself as an alternative to phenomenology, but as its deepening from within. It takes up the Husserlian demand for eidetic rigor and the method

of eidetic variation to establish the necessity of the triad. It inscribes itself within the Heideggerian movement of surpassing the constituting subject toward being-in-the-world. It extends the Levinasian discovery of the primacy of the Other. And it accomplishes what Ricœur had initiated with the notion of *responsum* by giving it the form of a structural law.

What the Mahoukou Law adds that the tradition could not produce alone is precisely the formalization of Resonance as an autonomous and irreducible third moment — and with it, the possibility of an immanent normative critique of the forms of existence that organize its absence.

IV. Structure and Use of This Volume

Each of the six notes is autonomous and may be read independently of the others. It begins with a faithful and rigorous exposition of the canonical treatment of the theme in the phenomenological tradition. It then proceeds to the application of the Mahoukou Law to the same theme. It closes with a synthetic assessment of the new conceptual contributions. Each note is accompanied by a selective bibliography organized by domain.

The phenomenology of interpellation does not substitute itself for the phenomenological tradition — it takes up where that tradition left off, from the precise point at which it stopped. What the six notes that follow show together is that this stopping point is always the same: the moment at which Resonance ought to have been thematized as an autonomous category — and was not.

Phenomenology and Aesthetics

Canonical Treatment and the Contribution of the Mahoukou Law (A2R Triad)

Abstract — This note examines phenomenology and aesthetics from two perspectives: the treatment given it by the phenomenological tradition from Husserl to Dufrenne and Heidegger, and the enrichment brought by the Mahoukou Law, grounded in the Call-Response-Resonance (A2R) triad. The central argument is that authentic aesthetic experience is a triadic interpellative event in which the artwork calls, the subject responds, and Resonance transforms both poles of the encounter.

I. Canonical Treatment: The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience

1.1 The Husserlian Heritage: Intentionality and Fulfilment

The phenomenology of aesthetics has its source in the Husserlian analysis of intentionality. Every consciousness is consciousness-of-something; aesthetic experience is first of all an act of intending by which the subject directs itself toward the artwork as its intentional correlate.¹ Husserl distinguishes the noetic act (the intending) and the noema (the intended sense), allowing us to think the specificity of the aesthetic object as an ideal unity irreducible to its material supports. The artwork gives itself through sketches (*Abschattungen*), but aesthetic experience tends toward a fullness of givenness that exceeds ordinary perception.

1.2 Merleau-Ponty: The Lived Body and Expressivity

Maurice Merleau-Ponty shifts the center of gravity: aesthetic experience is not first of all an act of consciousness but a mobilization of the lived body.² The painter does not “think” the painting; he inhabits the world with his body and makes of this co-habitation an expression. Style is not a property of the artwork but a mode of the body’s being-in-the-world. Temporality plays a structuring role here: the artwork unfolds in retention and protention.³

1.3 Ingarden and Dufrenne: The Artwork as Stratified Intentional Object

Roman Ingarden elaborates a phenomenological ontology of the literary work grounded in the theory of strata.⁴ The work is a purely intentional object whose completion requires

¹Husserl, E., *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, Allen & Unwin, 1931, § 85–86.

²Merleau-Ponty, M., *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith, Routledge, 1962, p. 235 ff.

³Husserl, E., *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, trans. J. B. Brough, Kluwer, 1991.

⁴Ingarden, R., *The Literary Work of Art*, trans. G. G. Grabowicz, Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1931].

concretion by the reader. Mikel Dufrenne radicalizes this approach by distinguishing the aesthetic object from the artwork as thing: aesthetic experience is an affective a priori that reveals a world proper to the artwork.⁵

1.4 Heidegger and Gadamer: The Artwork as Event of Truth

Heidegger refuses to think the artwork from the perspective of the aesthetic subject: the artwork sets up a world and sets forth the earth — it is an event of truth (Aletheia).⁶ Gadamer extends this perspective by insisting on the eventful character of the encounter: to understand a work is to be seized by it, to participate in a play (Spiel) that surpasses the author's intentions.⁷ Both perspectives open the way to a conception of aesthetic encounter, but without formalizing its triadic structure.

II. The Contribution of the Mahoukou Law: Aesthetics as a Triadic Interpellative Event

2.1 The Artwork as Call: An Address in Excess

The Mahoukou Law invites us to reformulate what an artwork does to the one who encounters it. The artwork is not merely an intentional correlate or an event of truth: it is a Call — an address that targets a singular addressee and carries a demand in excess of any transmissible content.⁸ The Call of the artwork cannot be reduced to the creator's intention or to its objectifiable formal structure. It is irreducibly addressed: it summons whoever exposes himself to it to respond. This reformulation enriches the Heideggerian notion of the artwork-as-event by introducing into it the structure of intersubjective address that Heidegger maintained in intransitivity.

2.2 The Aesthetic Response: The Subject's Existential Commitment

The Response to the artwork's Call is not mere enjoyment nor a judgment of taste in the Kantian sense. It implies an existential commitment: recognizing oneself as the one to whom the artwork is addressed, assuming the responsibility of this interpellation. The tradition described this dimension under the terms of participation (Gadamer) or bodily implication (Merleau-Ponty), but without elevating it to the rank of a normative structure. The

⁵Dufrenne, M., *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*, trans. E. S. Casey, Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1953].

⁶Heidegger, M., "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter, Harper & Row, 1971.

⁷Gadamer, H.-G., *Truth and Method*, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall, Crossroad, 1989 [1960], pp. 80–145.

⁸Mahoukou, C., "The Phenomenological Law of Interpellation: Call-Response-Resonance," unpublished ms., § III.2.

Mahoukou Law allows a precision here: the purely formal Response — the gaze that slides over the artwork without committing — constitutes a form of dialogal impediment at the level of the second moment of the triad.

2.3 Resonance as the Criterion of Aesthetic Authenticity

The most original contribution of the Mahoukou Law lies in the thematization of Resonance as an autonomous category.⁹ Aesthetic Resonance designates the transformative echo that the encounter with the artwork leaves in the subject — and, more boldly, in the artwork itself as it is modified in the history of its receptions. It is retroactive, transformative, and often deferred. It is carefully distinguished from Rosa's sociological Resonanz,¹⁰ in that it is a structural phenomenological category proper to the interpellative event, not a general quality of the relation to the world.

2.4 Dialogal Impediment: Immanent Critique of Consumer Culture

The notion of dialogal impediment finds in the aesthetic domain a particularly fertile critical application.¹¹ Contemporary forms of cultural consumption — timed museum visits, music as background sound, contemplation fragmented by social media — structurally organize the prevention of Resonance: the Call is neutralized before it can engage, the Response is substituted by a reaction (the like), and Resonance is rendered impossible by the immediacy of passage to the next object. This critique radicalizes the one Dewey formulated against the separation of art and experience,¹² now disposing of a precise conceptual tool to identify its phenomenological mechanisms.

2.5 Assessment

In summary, the Mahoukou Law brings three clear conceptual gains to the phenomenology of aesthetics. First, it formalizes the triadic structure of authentic aesthetic experience where the tradition offered only partial descriptions. Second, it introduces Resonance as an internal criterion of aesthetic authenticity, allowing a rigorous distinction between experience and

⁹*Ibid.*, § IV.1-2.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, § IV.3. Resonance is distinguished from Rosa's Resonanz (Resonanz, Suhrkamp, 2016) in that it is a structural, not merely sociological, category.

¹¹*Ibid.*, § V.1-2, on the category of dialogal impediment.

¹²Dewey, J., *Art as Experience*, Minton, Balch & Company, 1934.

consumption. Third, it grounds an immanent normative critique of the conditions that obstruct authentic aesthetic encounter, without appealing to any external norm.

Selected bibliography: Dufrenne (1953/1973); Gadamer (1960/1989); Heidegger (1935/1971); Husserl (1913/1931; 1928/1991); Ingarden (1931/1973); Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962; 1964); Dewey (1934); Rosa (2016/2019); Mahoukou, unpublished ms.

Husserl, or the Ambivalences of Phenomenology

Canonical Treatment and the Contribution of the Mahoukou Law (A2R Triad)

Abstract — Husserl's work is traversed by irreducible internal tensions. The central argument is that these ambivalences are not aporias to be overcome from the outside, but the symptoms of a structural lacuna that the A2R triad allows us to diagnose precisely: Husserl thinks consciousness without interpellation, the subject without the Other's Call, and intentionality without Resonance.

I. Canonical Treatment: The Internal Ambivalences of Husserlian Phenomenology

1.1 The Founding Ambition: Phenomenology as Rigorous Science

From his earliest works, Husserl harbors the ambition of a philosophy grounded with full rigor, capable of overcoming psychologism and relativism.¹³ Phenomenology presents itself as a *Wissenschaft* whose method — the transcendental reduction or *epoché* — suspends all theses about the existence of the world in order to describe the pure structures of intentional consciousness. Yet it is precisely this ambition that generates the first tensions: can lived experience be thought with full scientific rigor without betraying its very texture?

1.2 First Ambivalence: Transcendental Idealism and the Lifeworld

The most fundamental tension opposes the transcendental idealism of Ideas I and the attention to the *Lebenswelt* that imposes itself in the Crisis of European Sciences.¹⁴ On one side, the transcendental reduction suspends the natural world to reveal constituting consciousness as an absolute ground.¹⁵ On the other, Husserl recognizes in his late work that this ground is itself carried by a pre-given lived world, prior to all reflection. This ambivalence nourished the divergent readings of Merleau-Ponty and Fink.

1.3 Second Ambivalence: Methodological Solipsism and Intersubjectivity

The transcendental reduction isolates the monadic consciousness, which seems to lead to solipsism. Husserl attempts to answer this in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation through the

¹³Husserl, E., *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. D. Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, § 1–2.

¹⁴Husserl, E., *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr, Northwestern University Press, 1970, § 9.

¹⁵Husserl, E., *Ideas I*, op. cit., § 49–50.

theory of Einfühlung and Appräsentation: the alter ego is reached by analogy with my own body, not through direct intuition.¹⁶ But this solution is widely judged unsatisfactory by his successors: it does not transcend the first-person standpoint.

1.4 Third Ambivalence: Self-Presence and Différance

In the Logical Investigations, the inner voice of monologue seems to realize an ideal self-presence, without detour through the sign. Derrida showed decisively that this self-presence is already undermined by a constitutive différance: Husserlian consciousness never fully possesses itself.¹⁷

1.5 Readings that Have Turned These Ambivalences to Productive Use: Ricœur, Lévinas, Henry

Ricœur reads Husserl as a thinker of mediation and detour.¹⁸ Lévinas turns intentionality against itself: it is the Other, not consciousness, that constitutes the starting point of authentic phenomenology.¹⁹ Michel Henry rejects intentionality as an adequate structure for the self-manifestation of life.²⁰ These three readings converge to show that Husserl's ambivalences are sites of thought, not mere errors.

II. The Contribution of the Mahoukou Law: Diagnosing the Structural Lacuna in Husserl

2.1 The Lacuna the Mahoukou Law Identifies: A Phenomenology without Call

The Mahoukou Law allows us to formulate precisely what the Husserlian ambivalences reveal in hollow.²¹ The diagnosis is as follows: Husserlian phenomenology thinks consciousness without the Other's Call. Intentionality is a unilateral movement — from consciousness toward the object — that leaves no room for the structure of address that characterizes the Call in the A2R triad. The Husserlian subject intends, constitutes, reduces; it is never, as such, interpellated.

¹⁶Husserl, E., *Cartesian Meditations*, op. cit., Fifth Meditation, § 42–54: the constitution of the alter ego by analogical apperception.

¹⁷Derrida, J., *Speech and Phenomena*, trans. D. B. Allison, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 60 ff.

¹⁸Ricœur, P., *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. E. G. Ballard and L. E. Embree, Northwestern University Press, 1967, pp. 9–40.

¹⁹Lévinas, E., *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, trans. R. A. Cohen and M. B. Smith, Northwestern University Press, 1998, pp. 7–52.

²⁰Henry, M., *The Essence of Manifestation*, trans. G. Etzkorn, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, § 1.

²¹Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § II.4.

2.2 The Missing Call: Linking the Husserlian Ambivalences to the A2R Triad

Read through the A2R triad, the Fifth Cartesian Meditation appears in a new light. The constitution of the alter ego through apperception²² proceeds from an indirect givenness, without recourse to a structure of call. Lacking the thought that the other addresses to me a Call irreducible to my intentional constitution, Husserl can only reach intersubjectivity by constructing it from the self. The intersubjective ambivalence of Husserl is the symptom of a phenomenology of the missing Call.

2.3 The Absent Resonance: Why Husserlian Consciousness Does Not Transform Itself

Resonance, in the sense of the Mahoukou Law, is what modifies the existential state of both parties in an authentic interpellation.²³ Yet Husserlian consciousness is constituting without being modified by what it constitutes: it intends the object, but the object does not transform it. This structural absence of Resonance explains why Husserlian phenomenology struggles to account for ethical experience (Lévinas), pathic experience (Henry), and narrative experience (Ricœur).

2.4 Dialogal Impediment as a Critical Reading Category for Husserl

Impediment at the level of the Call²⁴ may be applied retrospectively to the Husserlian method: the epoché itself, in suspending the natural world and other subjects, constitutes a bracketing of the Call. The late Lebenswelt²⁵ may then be reread as Husserl's own implicit recognition that the epoché had suspended something irreplaceable: the ground of pre-reflective interpellations in which every subject is always already engaged.

2.5 Assessment: Surpassing Husserl through Husserl

The decisive contribution of the Mahoukou Law is to allow us to surpass Husserl through Husserl — from within his own ambivalences, not against them. By formalizing the triadic structure of interpellation, the Mahoukou Law accomplishes what Husserl had sketched without being able to systematize: a phenomenology of authentic encounter between subjects. The clinical and political extensions opened by the Mahoukou Law²⁶ constitute

²²Husserl, E., *Cartesian Meditations*, op. cit., § 50.

²³Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § IV.1-2: Resonance as the retroactive and transformative character of the interpellative event.

²⁴Ibid., § V.2: impediment at the level of the Call arises when the address is not sincerely engaged or aims at manipulation.

²⁵Husserl, E., *Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit., § 28-34: the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) as the forgotten ground of the sciences.

²⁶Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § VI: possible extensions of the Law — notably toward a clinical phenomenology of interpellation.

precisely the projects that the Husserlian ambivalences had made necessary without being able to initiate them.

Selected bibliography: Husserl (1900–1901; 1913/1931; 1928/1991; 1931/1960; 1936/1970); Derrida (1967/1973); Henry (1963/1973); Lévinas (1949/1998); Ricœur (1967); Mahoukou, unpublished ms.

Phenomenology of Environmental Humanism

Canonical Treatment and the Contribution of the Mahoukou Law (A2R Triad)

Abstract — *This note examines the phenomenology of environmental humanism through the double prism of the canonical treatment — from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to Jonas and Næss — and the contribution of the Mahoukou Law. The central argument is that the contemporary ecological crisis can be read as a massive form of dialogal impediment: nature launches a Call that modern societies refuse to hear as an engaged Response, and whose transformative Resonance is structurally blocked by the modes of life of acceleration.*

I. Canonical Treatment: Phenomenology Facing the Environmental Question

1.1 The Lived Body and Being-in-the-World: Phenomenological Foundations

For Merleau-Ponty, the lived body is the originary medium through which a subject inhabits its milieu.²⁷ The world is not a collection of things represented by a consciousness, but a field of sense in which the body is from the outset engaged, oriented, and attuned. Likewise, the Husserlian *Lebenswelt* designates the pre-given ground of experience in which the human being is always already immersed prior to any theorizing.²⁸

1.2 Heidegger: Dwelling and Care of the Earth

Dasein is always already in a world, amid things with which it stands in a practical relation prior to any theoretical relation.²⁹ In his later writings, Heidegger develops a thought of dwelling (*Wohnen*) as a fundamental mode of human existence. Authentic dwelling implies a relation of care (*Sorge*) toward the earth, which stands opposed to the technical domination of nature.

1.3 Deep Ecology and Jonas: From Phenomenology to Environmental Ethics

Næss defends an enlarged conception of the self — the ecological Self — that surpasses the boundaries of the individual to include all living beings with which it stands in relation.³⁰

²⁷ Merleau-Ponty, M., *Phenomenology of Perception*, op. cit., pp. 164–202.

²⁸ Husserl, E., *Crisis of European Sciences*, op. cit., § 34–36.

²⁹ Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Harper & Row, 1962, § 22–24.

³⁰ Næss, A., *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle*, trans. D. Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Jonas develops in *The Imperative of Responsibility* an ethics grounded in the vulnerability of nature and responsibility toward future generations.³¹

1.4 Abram, Ingold, Berque: Phenomenologies of Milieu and Dwelling

David Abram describes how oral cultures maintain with their environment a relation of reciprocal animation: the landscape speaks, interpellates, responds to those who know how to listen.³² Tim Ingold develops the notion of dwelling to designate a mode of being-in-the-world grounded in perceptual and practical engagement within a milieu.³³ Augustin Berque forges the concept of mesology — the science of the coupling between subject and milieu.³⁴

II. The Contribution of the Mahoukou Law: Nature as Call and the Ecological Crisis as Dialogal Impediment

2.1 Nature as Call: Reformulating Environmental Interpellation

The Mahoukou Law offers a novel conceptual framework for thinking the human's relation to nature.³⁵ Nature interpellates. Extreme climatic phenomena, species extinction, and the degradation of living milieus constitute Calls in the strongest sense of the term — addresses that summon human societies to respond.

2.2 The Vulnerability of Nature as Structure of the Call: Dialogue with Jonas

The Jonasian notion of the vulnerability of nature³⁶ finds in the Mahoukou Law a precise phenomenological reformulation. The Mahoukou Law adds something Jonas does not thematize: Resonance. An environmental policy without Resonance — without modification of the existential state of those who implement it — falls short of what the triad requires.

2.3 Ecological Resonance: Reciprocal Transformation of Subject and Milieu

Resonance, in the A2R triad, is retroactive: it affects the caller as well as the called.³⁷ Applied to the ecological relation, this property expresses what the traditions of dwelling described without conceptualizing it thus: the natural milieu is transformed by human presence, but

³¹Jonas, H., *The Imperative of Responsibility*, trans. H. Jonas and D. Herr, University of Chicago Press, 1984 [1979].

³²Abram, D., *The Spell of the Sensuous, Pantheon*, 1996.

³³Ingold, T., *The Perception of the Environment*, Routledge, 2000, pp. 14–33.

³⁴Berque, A., *Écoumène. Introduction à l'étude des milieux humains*, Belin, 2000.

³⁵Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § III.2.

³⁶Jonas, H., op. cit., pp. 90–95.

³⁷Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § IV.1: “Resonance is retroactive: it affects the caller as well as the called.”

the human is also transformed by its milieu. Ecological Resonance designates this reciprocal co-transformation.

2.4 The Ecological Crisis as Generalized Dialogal Impediment

Impediment can occur at all three levels of the triad. At the level of the Response,³⁸ modern societies refuse to recognize themselves as the addressees of nature's Call. At the level of Resonance,³⁹ even when a formal Response is formulated — climate summits, international agreements — it leaves no transformative trace in the subjects and institutions that produced it.

2.5 Dialogue with Rosa and Assessment

Rosa identifies nature as one of the registers of resonance most threatened by modern social acceleration.⁴⁰ But where Rosa thinks resonance as a general quality of the relation to the world, the Mahoukou Law allows a more precise structural analysis: it is not merely that nature “responds less” in accelerated modernity, but that the triadic structure of ecological interpellation is systematically blocked at one of its three moments. The contribution is thus threefold: an ontology of nature's Call, Resonance as a normative criterion of authentic relation to the milieu, and an immanent critique of environmental policies that produce Responses without Resonance.

Selected bibliography: Heidegger (1927/1962; 1954/1971); Husserl (1936/1970); Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962); Jonas (1979/1984); Næss (1989); Abram (1996); Berque (2000); Ingold (2000); Rosa (2016/2019); Mahoukou, unpublished ms.

³⁸*Ibid.*, § V.2: dialogal impediment at the level of the Response arises when the addressee refuses to recognize himself as interpellated.

³⁹*Ibid.*, § V.3: dialogal impediment at the level of Resonance — the exchange has apparently taken place, but no transformation has occurred.

⁴⁰Rosa, H., *Resonance: A Sociology of Our Relationship to the World*, trans. J. C. Wagner, Polity, 2019, pp. 295–340.

Phenomenology of Social Time

Canonical Treatment and the Contribution of the Mahoukou Law (A2R Triad)

Abstract — *Social time designates the way in which collective structures shape subjects' temporal experience. The central argument is that the A2R triad is irreducibly temporal: the Call opens a time of encounter, the Response commits a subject in duration, and Resonance reveals itself only after the fact. Contemporary social acceleration therefore constitutes a temporal dialogal impediment that destroys the minimal conditions of all authentic interpellation.*

I. Canonical Treatment: Phenomenology and Sociology of Social Time

1.1 Lived Temporality in Husserl: Retention, Impression, Protention

Against any atomistic conception of the present as a punctual instant, Husserl describes the tripartite structure of the temporal perceptual act: retention (the holding of the just-having-elapsed), the originary impression (the living now), and protention (anticipation of what is to come).⁴¹ This structure accounts for the perception of a melody: not a series of juxtaposed instants, but a unified flux in which the recent past and the immediate future are co-present to the living now.

1.2 Heidegger and Ricœur: Existential Temporality and Narrated Time

Heidegger radicalizes the Husserlian analysis by showing that temporality is the fundamental structure of Dasein itself.⁴² Paul Ricœur then performs the decisive mediation between lived time and social time by showing that it is narrative — muthos, emplotment — that allows human time to be configured.⁴³ Social time is not simply undergone: it is given form by collective narrative practices — calendars, commemorations, founding stories.

1.3 Schutz and the Synchronization of Streams of Consciousness

The face-to-face relation (We-relationship) is the prototype of all sociality: two consciousnesses live together in a shared living present, their streams of consciousness synchronizing in the growing older together.⁴⁴ Schutz thus opens the way to an analysis of

⁴¹Husserl, E., *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, op. cit.

⁴²Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, op. cit., § 65–66.

⁴³Ricœur, P., *Time and Narrative*, vol. III, trans. K. Blamey and D. Pellauer, University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 13–53.

⁴⁴Schutz, A., *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. G. Walsh and F. Lehnert, Northwestern University Press, 1967, pp. 11–44.

the pathologies of social synchronization, which Rosa will develop under the concept of acceleration.

1.4 Rosa: Social Acceleration and Temporal Alienation

Rosa identifies three dimensions of social acceleration: technical acceleration, the acceleration of social change, and the acceleration of the pace of life.⁴⁵ This generalized acceleration produces a form of temporal alienation: the modern subject runs without advancing, accumulates without possessing, responds without listening. Rosa's answer — resonance as an authentic relation to the world⁴⁶ — remains, however, essentially diagnostic and sociological.

II. The Contribution of the Mahoukou Law: The Intrinsic Temporality of the A2R Triad

2.1 The A2R Triad as an Irreducible Temporal Structure

The Call opens a time: it institutes an in-between in which encounter becomes possible, which presupposes a minimal duration of exposure and waiting.⁴⁷ The Response commits a subject in duration: responding authentically implies stopping, receiving the Call, deliberating.⁴⁸ Resonance is by essence deferred: it often reveals itself only after the fact, in the duration of life and memory.⁴⁹ Any social structure that destroys these temporal conditions organizes dialogal impediment.

2.2 Social Acceleration as Temporal Dialogal Impediment

Social acceleration does not simply produce a subjective lack of time.⁵⁰ It structurally destroys the three moments of the triad. It compresses the time of the Call. It imposes a reflexive Response: reaction replaces response. And it cancels the conditions of Resonance: the flux of stimulations prevents any transformative trace from inscribing itself in duration.

⁴⁵Rosa, H., *Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity*, trans. J. Trejo-Mathys, Columbia University Press, 2013 [2005].

⁴⁶Rosa, H., *Resonance*, op. cit., pp. 63–110.

⁴⁷Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § III.2: *the structure of the Call as the opening of a temporally situated dialogal space*.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, § III.3: “The Response is not a simple causal reaction to the Call but an act in the full sense: a free gesture that commits the responding subject.”

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, § IV.1: *Resonance is “invisible at the moment of the exchange itself, often revealing itself only after the fact, in the duration.”*

⁵⁰Rosa, H., *Social Acceleration*, op. cit., pp. 215–240.

2.3 Resonance as the Criterion of Authentic Social Time

A social interaction without Resonance — where both parties exit the exchange exactly as they entered it — reveals retrospectively that there was no genuine interpellation, but a simulation.⁵¹ The Mahoukou Law thus introduces a distinction between chronological time and interpellative time — between measurable duration and the density of authentic encounter.

2.4 Institutional Social Time and Structural Dialogal Impediment

An institution that imposes rhythms too rapid for the Call to be received, the Response to be deliberated, and Resonance to inscribe itself in duration, constitutes a structure of temporal dialogal impediment.⁵² This analysis applies notably to educational institutions (the lecture as Call without space for Response), political institutions (the media debate that destroys the temporal conditions of authentic interpellation), and care institutions (the chronometrically timed consultation as clinical dialogal impediment).

2.5 Assessment

In summary, the Mahoukou Law enriches the phenomenology of social time along three axes: it reveals the constitutive temporality of the interpellative structure; it introduces deferred Resonance as a category allowing us to distinguish dense time from filled time; it grounds an immanent normative critique of institutions and temporal regimes that structurally organize the absence of Resonance.

Selected bibliography: Heidegger (1927/1962); Husserl (1928/1991); Ricœur (1983–1985/1984–1988); Berger and Luckmann (1966); Schutz (1932/1967); Rosa (2005/2013; 2016/2019); Mahoukou, unpublished ms.

⁵¹Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § IV.2: “An encounter without Resonance reveals retrospectively that there was no genuine interpellation, but a simulation of interpellation.”

⁵²*Ibid.*, § V.2: impediment at the level of the Response arises when the addressee “produces a purely defensive response, or engages in a façade dialogue.”

Species, Universals, and Properties: Husserlian Phenomenology and Analytic Metaphysics

Canonical Treatment and the Contribution of the Mahoukou Law (A2R Triad)

Abstract — *The question of species, universals, and properties constitutes one of the most fertile points of contact between Husserlian phenomenology and contemporary analytic metaphysics. The central argument is that the A2R triad is itself an eidetic structure — a species in the Husserlian sense — whose three moments stand in relations of mutual dependence formalizable within the framework of formal ontology.*

I. Canonical Treatment: Universals, Species, and Properties between Husserl and Analytic Metaphysics

1.1 Husserl and the Theory of Species: Against Abstractionist Psychologism

In the Second Logical Investigation, Husserl attacks abstractionist theories that seek to reduce general concepts to subjective representations.⁵³ For Husserl, the species — red in general, triangle in general — is an ideal unity irreducible to its particular instances. This thesis of the ideality of species constitutes the foundation of Husserlian formal ontology.

1.2 Eidetic Variation: The Method of Disclosing Essences

By freely varying a given object in imagination, modifying its properties one by one, one discloses by contrast what remains invariant — the essence or eidos of the object.⁵⁴ The resulting formal ontology distinguishes material essences (proper to a domain of objects) from formal essences (valid for any object in general), and develops a theory of relations of dependence between parts and wholes.⁵⁵

1.3 Analytic Metaphysics of Universals: Realism, Nominalism, Tropes

Universals realism (Armstrong⁵⁶) holds that properties are universals really instantiated in particulars. Nominalism (Lewis⁵⁷) refuses universals and recognizes only particulars linked

⁵³Husserl, E., *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, trans. J. N. Findlay, Routledge, 1970, Investigation II: “The Ideality of Species and Modern Theories of Abstraction.”

⁵⁴Husserl, E., *Ideas I*, op. cit., § 2-4.

⁵⁵Husserl, E., *Experience and Judgment*, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, Northwestern University Press, 1973, § 64-87.

⁵⁶Armstrong, D. M., *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction*, Westview Press, 1989, pp. 75-112.

⁵⁷Lewis, D., *On the Plurality of Worlds*, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 50-69.

by resemblance relations. Lowe's four-category ontology⁵⁸ represents one of the most elaborated syntheses of this debate.

1.4 Points of Contact and Zones of Friction between the Two Traditions

The truthmaker theory of Mulligan, Simons, and Smith draws explicitly on Husserlian formal ontology.⁵⁹ Barry Smith has shown that the Husserlian distinctions between independent and dependent parts correspond to analytic debates about tropes and universals.⁶⁰ Jocelyn Benoist has critically examined the relation between the phenomenological essence and the property in the analytic sense.⁶¹

II. The Contribution of the Mahoukou Law: The A2R Triad as Eidetic Structure and Contribution to Formal Ontology

2.1 The Mahoukou Law as Eidetic Law: The Ontological Status of the Triad

The Mahoukou Law explicitly claims the status of a phenomenological law in the Husserlian sense: not an empirical regularity, but an eidetic structure.⁶² If one freely varies interpellative events — imaginatively suppressing the Call, or the Response, or the Resonance — one invariably finds that authentic interpellation cannot give itself without the presence of all three moments. The A2R triad thus possesses the status of a material essence proper to the domain of interpellative events.

2.2 The Three Moments of the Triad as Essential Properties: Dialogue with Fine and Armstrong

The three properties characterizing each moment of the triad can be analyzed as essential properties in the sense of Kit Fine.⁶³ The Call possesses three irreducible essential properties: being addressed, being in excess of itself, and opening a dialogal space.⁶⁴ Resonance possesses

⁵⁸Lowe, E. J., *The Four-Category Ontology*, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 20–48.

⁵⁹Mulligan, K., Simons, P. and Smith, B., "Truth-makers," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 44 (3), 1984, pp. 287–321.

⁶⁰Smith, B. and Woodruff Smith, D. (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

⁶¹Benoist, J., *Éléments de philosophie réaliste*, Vrin, 2011, pp. 87–130.

⁶²Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § III.1: *the status and meaning of a phenomenological law — the distinction between empirical regularity and eidetic structure.*

⁶³Fine, K., "Essence and Modality," *Philosophical Perspectives*, 8, 1994, pp. 1–16.

⁶⁴Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § III.2: "The Call constitutes the first moment of the triad. It is characterized by three essential properties: it is always addressed, it is in excess of itself, it opens a dialogal space."

three essential properties: being retroactive, being transformative, and being temporally deferred.⁶⁵

2.3 The Relations of Dependence between the Three Moments: A Formal Ontology of Interpellation

The theory of relations of dependence between parts and wholes⁶⁶ allows a precise formalization: the three moments are mutually dependent in the Husserlian sense. The Call without Response remains a dead letter; the Response without Call is a reaction without addressee; Resonance without the first two moments is groundless. The triad thus forms a founded whole (*fundiertes Ganzes*).⁶⁷

2.4 Dialogal Impediment as an Immanent Normative Category: Toward a Deontic Ontology

Dialogal impediment is an immanent normative category: the norm it expresses is not external to the phenomenon but inscribed in its very eidetic structure.⁶⁸ The A2R triad is not only a descriptive structure of interpellation, but a prescriptive structure that defines what interpellation must be in order to be what it is.

2.5 Assessment

The Mahoukou Law brings three original contributions to the dialogue between the two traditions: a concrete case of application of Husserlian formal ontology to intersubjective events; a formal ontology of the interpellative event grounded in tripartite mutual dependence; and an immanent deontic ontology — dialogal impediment as a norm inscribed in the eidetic structure — that shifts the debate beyond the mere description of properties toward a structural normativity irreducible to external prescriptions.

Selected bibliography: Husserl (1900–1901/1970; 1913/1931; 1939/1973); Armstrong (1989); Fine (1994); Lewis (1986); Lowe (2006); Benoist (2011); Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984); Smith and Woodruff Smith (1995); Mahoukou, unpublished ms.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, § IV.1: “Resonance is distinguished from the Response by at least three irreducible characters: it is retroactive, transformative, and invisible at the moment of the exchange itself.”

⁶⁶Husserl, E., *Logical Investigations*, op. cit., Investigation III: “On the Theory of Wholes and Parts.”

⁶⁷Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § III.A: “The triad forms an organic unity and not a simple succession.”

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, § V.1: dialogal impediment as an immanent normative category.

Metaphysical Stakes of a Phenomenology of Captivity

Canonical Treatment and the Contribution of the Mahoukou Law (A2R Triad)

Abstract — *Captivity — understood in the broadest sense: imprisonment, confinement, colonization of the body, existential isolation — constitutes a phenomenological limit-case of exceptional density. The central argument is that captivity, in its most radical forms, constitutes an absolute dialogal impediment: it systematically destroys the three moments of the A2R triad, reducing the subject to an existence without possible interpellation.*

I. Canonical Treatment: Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Captivity

1.1 Finitude and Being-Thrown: Heideggerian Foundations

Anxiety is the mode of openness to irreducible facticity: it reveals to Dasein its being-thrown, its groundlessness, its radical finitude.⁶⁹ Captivity may be read as a radicalization of the condition of thrownness: where ordinary Dasein is thrown into an open world, the captive is thrown into a closed world, whose horizons of existence are systematically restricted.

1.2 Sartre and Merleau-Ponty: Freedom in Situation and the Captive Body

Sartre affirms that freedom is absolute even in situations of constraint.⁷⁰ Merleau-Ponty offers a decisive corrective: if the lived body is the originary medium of being-in-the-world,⁷¹ then the captivity of the body is also a captivity of the world. The restriction of bodily space profoundly reorganizes the perceptual, motor, and practical field of the subject.

1.3 Ricœur and Selfhood Put to the Test

Ricœur develops the concept of attestation: the practical certainty the subject has of itself through its capacities — to speak, to act, to narrate, to answer for itself.⁷² Captivity subjects this attestation to extreme pressure. By thinking selfhood as the capacity to respond (responsum), Ricœur implicitly opens the way to a phenomenology of captivity as the destruction of the capacity for Response.

⁶⁹ Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, op. cit., § 40.

⁷⁰ Sartre, J.-P., *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. E. Barnes, *Philosophical Library*, 1956, pp. 321–364.

⁷¹ Merleau-Ponty, M., *Phenomenology of Perception*, op. cit., pp. 172–202.

⁷² Ricœur, P., *Oneself as Another*, trans. K. Blamey, *University of Chicago Press*, 1992, pp. 137–166.

1.4 Scarry, Agamben, Fanon, Guenther: Extreme Forms of Captivity

Scarry shows that torture destroys the subject's world by first destroying its language.⁷³ Agamben identifies the Muselmann as the limit-figure of bare life.⁷⁴ Fanon describes the specific captivity of racial colonization: the colonized person's bodily schema is shattered by the racializing gaze of the other.⁷⁵ Guenther shows in a rigorous phenomenology that solitary confinement progressively destroys the detainee's lived world.⁷⁶

II. The Contribution of the Mahoukou Law: Captivity as Absolute Dialogal Impediment

2.1 Captivity as Destruction of the Call: The Interpellated Reduced to Silence

Captivity, in its most radical forms, operates first at the level of the Call: it destroys the very possibility of addressing an authentic interpellation.⁷⁷ The torture described by Scarry operates precisely at this level: it destroys the capacity to address a meaning. Fanon's racial colonization adds a further dimension: the colonized person's Call is structurally deflected by the racializing gaze.⁷⁸

2.2 Captivity as Impediment to the Response: Dispossession of the Capacity to Respond

Dialogal impediment at the level of the Response arises when the subject is deprived of the capacity to recognize himself as interpellated and to engage a free act of response.⁷⁹ Institutional captivity organizes precisely this dispossession: it imposes prefabricated responses (the extracted confession, the demanded obedience, institutional docility), substituting constrained reaction for the free act.

2.3 Impossible Resonance: The Captive's Existential Death

An encounter without Resonance — where the captive exits each interaction exactly as he entered it, if not diminished — is not an encounter: it is a simulation of interaction.⁸⁰ The

⁷³ Scarry, E., *The Body in Pain*, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 27–59.

⁷⁴ Agamben, G., *Remnants of Auschwitz*, trans. D. Heller-Roazen, Zone Books, 1999, pp. 15–56.

⁷⁵ Fanon, F., *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. C. L. Markmann, Grove Press, 1967 [1952], pp. 87–130.

⁷⁶ Guenther, L., *Solitary Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives*, University of Minnesota Press, 2013, pp. 1–42.

⁷⁷ Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § III.2: *the Call as opening a dialogal space — without Call, no encounter is possible.*

⁷⁸ Fanon, F., *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁷⁹ Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § V.2: *“Impediment at the level of the Response arises when the addressee refuses to recognize himself as interpellated.”*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, § IV.2: *“An encounter without Resonance reveals retrospectively that there was no genuine interpellation, but a simulation of interpellation.”*

Muselmann represents not only the destruction of the Call, but the total extinction of Resonance: a being that nothing reaches anymore, that nothing transforms, that nothing interpellates.

2.4 Absolute Dialogal Impediment as a Critical and Political Category

The notion of dialogal impediment, instituted as an immanent normative category by the Mahoukou Law,⁸¹ acquires in the context of captivity a decisive critical and political dimension.⁸² It allows us to name precisely what makes radical captivity a phenomenological violation – not merely a deprivation of liberty in the juridical sense, but a destruction of the very structure of the subject’s interpellative existence. It grounds a phenomenological ethics of resistance: to resist captivity is to keep alive the three moments of the triad.

2.5 Clinical and Political Contribution

At the clinical level,⁸³ the notion of dialogal impediment allows us to identify forms of relational suffering linked to the impossibility of being heard, of responding in one’s own name, and of resonating with others. At the political level,⁸⁴ it furnishes a critical tool for evaluating institutions according to the degree of dialogal impediment they produce – opening the way to a normative theory of institutional legitimacy grounded not in contract or procedure, but in the phenomenological conditions of authentic interpellation.

Selected bibliography: Heidegger (1927/1962); Lévinas (1961); Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962); Ricœur (1990/1992); Sartre (1943/1956); Agamben (1998/1999); Fanon (1952/1967); Guenther (2013); Scarry (1985); Mahoukou, unpublished ms.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, § V.1: *the immanent normative category – “it expresses what this phenomenon must be in order to be what it is.”*

⁸²*Ibid.*, § V.3: *“Dialogal impediment can thus ground an immanent critique of contemporary forms of interaction that devitalize encounter.”*

⁸³*Ibid.*, § V.4: *“In clinical phenomenology, it illuminates certain forms of relational suffering linked to the impossibility of being heard or of resonating with others.”*

⁸⁴Mahoukou, C., unpublished ms., § VI: *“A political theory grounded in the Mahoukou Law would allow us to think differently about the conditions of institutional legitimacy.”*

Closing Note

The six academic notes in this series have applied the Mahoukou Law (Call–Response–Resonance triad) to six themes from the phenomenology seminar of the Université Jean Moulin — Lyon 3, during the academic year 2024–2025. In each case, the same movement has imposed itself: the canonical treatment reveals the resources and limits of the phenomenological tradition; the Mahoukou Law identifies with precision the structural lacuna — the missing Call, the absent Resonance, the instituted dialogal impediment — and brings to it an original conceptual framework.

Captivity, the theme of the sixth note, constitutes perhaps the most revealing limit-case: there where all forms of dialogal impediment concentrate and become absolute, the Mahoukou Law shows at once the depth of the destruction and the direction of a possible resistance. This volume has sought to demonstrate, across six distinct terrains, that the phenomenology of interpellation is not a theory among others — it is a law that describes something irreducible in the structure of every authentic human encounter.

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