

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF INTERPELLATION

Position, Filiations and Displacements

An Epistemological Positioning Note

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This note aims to situate explicitly the paradigm of the anthropology of interpellation within the field of the human sciences and contemporary philosophy. It identifies its filiations, maps its productive dialogues, names its necessary ruptures, and formulates the distinctive displacement it introduces. It constitutes the academic reference document for the ongoing research programme.

I. THE FOUNDING GESTURE: THE HUMAN BEING AS BEING OF RESPONSE

Every paradigm is born from a gesture — a displacement of the gaze that reconfigures what one sees and what one can think. The founding gesture of the anthropology of interpellation is the following: to substitute for the question what is the human being? the question under what conditions can the human being respond freely to what calls it?

This displacement is not trivial. It breaks with the dominant presupposition of modern anthropologies, which think the human subject in terms of what it produces, what it desires, what it thinks, or what it undergoes. It proposes instead to think the subject in terms of what it responds to — and the conditions under which this response is possible.

The founding intuition may be formulated thus: the human being is not first and foremost a being of production, cognition or will. It is a being of response. It arises within a fabric of calls that precede it, constitute it and orient it. Its freedom is not the abstract freedom of a sovereign subject that gives itself its own ends: it is the concrete freedom of a being capable of deferring, discerning and responding to what calls it from deeper than itself.

This thesis entails a considerable consequence: if the human being is constituted by the regimes of call to which it is exposed, then the milieux of interpellation — the social, technological, institutional and cultural architectures that organise the distribution of calls — become the fundamental unit of anthropological analysis. No longer simply individuals, nor even social structures in the classical sense, but the regimes of call that configure the very possibility of human response.

It is this displacement — from subjects toward milieux, from individuals toward the ecological conditions of their formation — that constitutes the founding gesture of the paradigm.

II. ACKNOWLEDGED INHERITANCES: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CALL AS GROUND

The anthropology of interpellation does not emerge from nowhere. It belongs to a precise philosophical tradition — the phenomenology of the call — from which it inherits fundamental intuitions while displacing them toward territory that tradition had not yet explored.

Emmanuel Levinas: The Precedence of the Call over the Subject

The debt to Levinas is deep and acknowledged. His entire work may be read as a demonstration that the human subject is not the point of departure of existence — it is its result. What precedes the subject is the face of the other, which interpellates it, summons it to a responsibility it did not choose, and constitutes it in the very act of summoning it.

The Levinasian formula — here I am — is not an affirmation of self: it is a response. It says that human existence is originarily respondent, that subjectivity constitutes itself in the response to what calls it before it can posit itself.

Our paradigm inherits this fundamental intuition: the call precedes the subject. But it immediately performs a displacement: where Levinas limits his analysis to the ethical intersubjective relation — the face-to-face encounter with the other — the anthropology of interpellation generalises the structure of the call to the full range of interpellation regimes to which the human being is exposed: calls from institutions, techniques, traditions, vocations, attentional architectures. The call is not only that of the face of the other — it is also that of beauty, truth, vocation, God perhaps, and — in its pathological forms — that of the notification, the algorithm, the injunction to perform.

Jean-Louis Chrétien: Call and Response as Originary Structure

Jean-Louis Chrétien, in *L'Appel et la Réponse* (1992), provided the most rigorous philosophical analysis of the call-response structure as the originary condition of human existence. His central thesis — that responding is more originary than existing, that the human being is always already responding to something that has preceded it — is directly constitutive of our paradigm.

Chrétien shows that the human voice is itself always already a response — that it does not begin in absolute silence but in the echo of a received call. This intuition enabled us to think language, the gaze and the proper name as the first forms of interpellation that constitute the subject.

Our displacement from Chrétien concerns register: where his analysis remains essentially phenomenological and theological — thinking the call in its dimension of givenness, event and grace — our paradigm radically anthropologises this structure. It draws it out of the sole space of the relation to the absolute Other in order to deploy it in the analysis of concrete milieux — social, technological, political — in which calls are formed, distributed, hierarchised or rendered pathological.

Jean-Luc Marion: Givenness and Originary Receptivity

Jean-Luc Marion, with his phenomenology of givenness (*Étant donné*, 1997), contributes to our paradigm through the fundamental idea that the human subject is first and foremost a gifted — a being who receives before constituting, who is affected before acting, whose originary receptivity precedes all spontaneity. This passivity is not a weakness: it is the very structure of openness to the real.

Our paradigm takes up this intuition — the human being as being of reception before being of action — but displaces it toward an anthropology of the concrete conditions of this receptivity. If the human being is originally receptive, then the destruction of the conditions of its receptivity — through saturation, capture, permanent urgency — is the destruction of something anthropologically fundamental. It is this displacement — from pure phenomenology toward critical anthropology — that constitutes our proper contribution.

III. PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUES: CONVERGENCES AND INSUFFICIENCIES

The paradigm of the anthropology of interpellation enters into productive dialogue with several major contemporary thinkers. These dialogues are genuine — the convergences are substantial — but they also reveal, precisely at their limits, what our paradigm brings that is distinctively its own.

Hartmut Rosa: Resonance as Anthropological Structure

The proximity with Hartmut Rosa is the most immediate and the most visible. His work — notably *Resonance* (2018) and *Social Acceleration* (2010) — shares with our paradigm several fundamental intuitions: the critique of modern acceleration as the destruction of the conditions of deep human life, the importance of resonance as an irreducible anthropological structure, the refusal of the purely autonomous subject, the global civilisational diagnosis.

Rosa's concept of resonance — defined as a relation to the world characterised by mutual call, reciprocal transformation and fundamental unavailability — is directly constitutive of our A²R triad. Rosa has provided the most rigorous available description of what we call resonance as the third moment of the fundamental anthropological structure.

The rupture, however, is clear. Rosa thinks essentially the subject-world relation — he analyses what happens when the subject enters into resonance with the different spheres of social existence. Our paradigm goes upstream: to the conditions of possibility of resonance itself. Our question is not only what is a resonant relation? but in what anthropological milieu does a subject still become capable of resonance? Rosa describes and diagnoses the pathology of alienation. Our paradigm thinks the destruction of the conditions of formation of the resonant subject. One thinks the relation; the other thinks the ecological conditions of the relation — and therein lies our proper originality.

Bernard Stiegler: Attentional Capture and Disindividuation

Bernard Stiegler constitutes another major interlocutor. His analysis of the attention industries — the way contemporary technical systems capture, standardise and ultimately destroy individual and collective attentional capacities — directly converges with our diagnosis of captive calls and the destruction of the human womb.

Stiegler's notion of psychic proletarianisation is close to what we call vocational proletarianisation: the degradation of the capacity to discern, hierarchise and inhabit calls. His pharmacology — the idea that techniques are simultaneously poison and remedy — resonates with our proposal for a politics of interpellation milieux.

The rupture, however, is substantial. Stiegler thinks primarily from technique. His anthropology remains largely techno-centric. Our paradigm displaces the question toward a fundamental anthropology of human response that precedes and exceeds the critique of technique. We introduce dimensions Stiegler does not develop: an explicit theory of silence, a clinic of attentional milieux, an existential and phenomenological anthropology of response. Our question is more fundamental: not what does technique do to attention? but under what conditions can the human being still respond freely?

Byung-Chul Han: The Diagnosis of the Performance Society

Byung-Chul Han shares with our paradigm the diagnosis of the performance society and civilisational fatigue. His analyses of the transparency society, burnout and the disappearance of the Other converge with our critique of false calls and vocational pathologies. His defence of emptiness, withdrawal and contemplation is directly close to our anthropology of silence and rest.

The rupture is one of order and ambition. Han remains essentially diagnostic and aphoristic: his texts are brilliant analyses of contemporary symptoms, but they do not construct a systematic conceptual architecture. Our paradigm aims precisely at what Han does not provide: a rigorous formalisation, a general theory of interpellation milieux, a political and clinical institutionalisation of contemplative intuitions, a transmissible research programme. Han is less a structural anthropology than an aesthetics of withdrawal. Our paradigm is more ambitious in its systematicity.

Donald Winnicott: The Good Enough Environment

The encounter with Winnicott is of a different nature — it comes from the side of developmental psychology. But it is fundamental for our paradigm. His notion of the holding environment — the good enough environment that holds, contains and responds to the child, making possible the emergence of the self — is the psychological formulation of what our paradigm names milieu of interpellation at the general anthropological level. The Winnicottian transitional space, the capacity to be alone in the presence of the other, the distinction between the true self and the false self — all these categories directly nourish our theory of the human womb and vocational pathologies.

Our displacement from Winnicott is one of scale. Winnicott thinks individual psychic development — the mother-child relation, the formation of the self in the family context. Our paradigm generalises these structures to the civilisational, technological, political and juridical level. We implicitly transform the notion of holding environment into a general theory of interpellation milieux — applicable not only to the child and its mother, but to every human being in every social milieu.

René Girard: Mimetic Capture as a Pathology of the Call

René Girard constitutes an unexpected but fruitful interlocutor for our paradigm. His theory of mimetic desire — human desire is never spontaneous or self-generated; it is always mediated by a model who desires before us and in our place — converges with our anthropology of the call by a different but convergent path. In Girard as in our paradigm, the subject is not self-founded: it is constituted by a relation that precedes it, oriented by calls it did not choose.

But it is at the level of pathology that the convergence becomes most precise. Girard showed how mimetic desire can turn against itself: when the model becomes a rival, when imitation is transformed into rivalry and rivalry into violence, the subject is captured within a regime of call that constitutes it while destroying it. What Girard calls the mimetic crisis — the violent contamination of desires, the loss of all symbolic differentiation — is a paradigmatic figure of what we call a pathological milieu of interpellation: a regime of call that no longer forms the subject but fragments it, that no longer orients it but captures it.

The convergence with our analysis of digital platforms is striking. Recommendation algorithms are perfected mimetic machines: they organise the circulation of desires through imitation, amplify the dynamics of symbolic rivalry, and produce exactly the type of capture that Girard had described — no longer at the scale of the village or tribe, but at the industrial and individualised scale. In this sense, Girard provides our paradigm with a theory of the anthropological genesis of false calls — an explanation of how a call can turn against the freedom of the subject it was supposed to constitute.

Our displacement from Girard is nonetheless clear. Girard thinks essentially the dynamics of desires and their sacrificial resolution. Our paradigm does not think the resolution of mimetic conflict but the conditions of possibility of a non-mimetic response — the milieu in which the subject can receive deep calls without being immediately captured in a dynamic of competitive imitation. Where Girard seeks to unveil the mechanism in order to be freed from it, we seek to protect the anthropological conditions in which this mechanism does not engage.

IV. NECESSARY RUPTURES: WHAT OUR PARADIGM REFUSES

Every paradigm also defines itself by what it thinks against. The following ruptures are constitutive of our position.

Rupture with Computational Cognitivism

Computational cognitivism — in its strong forms, from Dennett to Pinker — thinks the human mind as information processing, consciousness as an adaptive function, the subject as a biological algorithm. This reduction is radically incompatible with our anthropology. Our paradigm affirms the irreducibility of the subject to cognition: pre-reflective depth, resonance, lived temporality, interior availability, the vocational dimension of existence — none of these can be captured by a computational model. The freedom of response is not a more complex decision algorithm — it is an existential structure of a different order.

Rupture with Technological Liberalism

Technological liberalism — the ideology of platforms, technological solutionism, certain transhumanist currents — presupposes an entirely sovereign individual confronting neutral tools it freely employs. Our paradigm breaks radically with this vision. It affirms that

technical milieux are never neutral — that they form regimes of call that configure the very possibility of free response. The question is not how can the individual better resist distractions? but what technical milieux are compatible with the formation of a subject capable of free response?

Rupture with Reductive Neuroscientism

Our paradigm engages willingly with the neurosciences — data on attentional saturation, cerebral plasticity and the Default Mode Network provide valuable empirical anchors for our theory of silence and resonance. But it refuses their reduction of the subject to cerebral mechanisms. The freedom of response, vocational resonance and the discernment of deep calls belong to a level of analysis — existential, phenomenological, anthropological — that the neurosciences cannot reach with their tools alone.

Rupture with Anthropologies of Autonomy

More fundamentally still, our paradigm breaks with the dominant tradition of modern anthropologies of autonomy — from Descartes to Sartre, through Kant and classical political liberalism. These anthropologies presuppose a self-founded subject whose freedom consists in freeing itself from all external attachment. Our paradigm affirms on the contrary that this abstract freedom is the least real of freedoms — and that concrete freedom, the freedom of response, supposes an originary receptivity, a readiness to be called, a capacity to be formed by what comes from outside. This is not to deny autonomy — it is to situate it as secondary to the receptivity that makes it possible.

Attentional Vulnerability as a Fundamental Anthropological Structure

More fundamentally still, the anthropology of interpellation belongs to a contemporary current of thought that has undertaken to rehabilitate vulnerability as a constitutive — and not accidental — structure of the human condition. This current, which runs through works as different as those of Levinas, Butler, Rosa, MacIntyre and Winnicott, constitutes the common ground on which our paradigm builds its distinctive displacements.

Levinas showed first that exposure to the other — the nakedness of the face, the impossibility of evading it — is not a weakness of the subject but its most originary structure. Judith Butler, in a different direction, showed that precariousness — corporeal, social and relational

dependence — is not a marginal condition but the shared condition of all human existence. Hartmut Rosa showed that resonance supposes a fundamental availability, a capacity to be affected: without this vulnerable openness, no resonance is possible, only the wall of alienation. Alasdair MacIntyre, in *Dependent Rational Animals*, recalled that human rationality is a rationality of dependent creatures — that our highest capacities always emerge in contexts of care, transmission and shared vulnerability. And Winnicott showed that the emergence of the self requires a holding environment — without which the infant's originary vulnerability cannot be transformed into a capacity for relation and response.

This current shares a common intuition: vulnerability is not what the subject needs to be protected from, but what the subject constitutes itself out of. To deny it is to destroy the very conditions of human formation.

The anthropology of interpellation belongs fully to this inheritance — and it is precisely from this shared ground that it introduces its own notion of attentional vulnerability. By this notion we mean something more specific than vulnerability in the general sense: the capacity of the subject to be affected by the calls addressed to it, to receive them with sufficient depth for them to be able to reach the human womb — that pre-reflective site where response is formed.

Attentional vulnerability is not a fragility to be overcome: **it is the condition of possibility of all free response and all durable resonance.**¹

What makes our epoch singularly problematic is precisely that contemporary architectures of interpellation operate a systematic destruction of this attentional vulnerability. Not by rendering the subject stronger or more autonomous, but by armoring it against the depth of calls: by saturating its capacity for reception, by substituting reaction for response, by rendering impossible the silence in which alone a call can be truly heard. What pathological milieux of interpellation destroy is not first and foremost freedom in the formal sense — it is the attentional vulnerability without which no real freedom can be exercised.

It is on this point that our paradigm distinguishes itself from the current to which it belongs: where Levinas, Butler, Rosa, MacIntyre and Winnicott think vulnerability as the constitutive structure of the subject, we think the conditions of possibility of this vulnerability itself. The

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displacement is by one level: no longer simply the human being is vulnerable, but under what conditions can this vulnerability remain fruitful rather than transforming into crushing or armoring?

V. THE DISTINCTIVE DISPLACEMENT: WHAT NONE OF THESE THINKERS FORMULATES

Having mapped the filiations, convergences and ruptures, it becomes possible to formulate with precision what the anthropology of interpellation brings that is distinctively its own – what none of its interlocutors formulates in these terms.

The A²R Triad as General Grammar

The first distinctive contribution is the formalisation of the Call-Response-Resonance triad as the general grammar of human living – applicable in a coherent manner to fundamental anthropology, existential philosophy, psychopathology, political philosophy and the critique of technologies. None of the thinkers examined proposes a formalisation at this level of integration. Our paradigm articulates their respective contributions within a unified grammar – and it is this unification that gives it its transdisciplinary scope.

The distinctive displacement of the anthropology of interpellation consists in shifting the centre of gravity of anthropological analysis: no longer primarily toward the contents of consciousness, cognitive structures or social relations taken in isolation, but toward the ecological, temporal and institutional conditions within which a free human response can still emerge.

The Human Womb as an Original Concept

The second distinctive contribution is the concept of the human womb – the pre-reflective site of gestation of response, the deep interior space that precedes opinion, explicit decision and conscious narrative identity. It is here that what will become response is formed, before any deliberation – or what will become only reaction if this site is saturated, colonised or destroyed.

Three precisions are necessary to grasp its exact status. This concept is not a psychological metaphor: it names a constitutive structure of every human subject, regardless of individual

particularity. This concept is not a substantialist deep self: the human womb is not a hidden essence behind appearances, a stable and closed interior identity. It is on the contrary open by constitution — and this openness is not an accidental fragility but a direct consequence of the very structure of the subject. This concept is not a Romantic interiority: the womb is relational from the outset, constituted by the calls it receives, formed by the milieu of interpellation in which the subject is immersed.

For if the human subject is not a self-founded substance — if it realises itself, if it subjectivises itself within and through the relation to a call that precedes it — then its deepest interiority cannot be closed. The womb is the site where the call is received before being processed, discerned, accepted or refused. It is open to the call as the condition of possibility of response. This constitutive openness is what renders the subject capable of resonance — and it is precisely this same openness that renders it vulnerable to capture.

This is why the human womb is, in our paradigm, simultaneously the most intimate and the most political concept. The most intimate because it designates the site where the subject constitutes itself in its own depth. The most political because it is the preferred target of algorithmic platforms — which do not attack the periphery of the subject, its surface behaviours or its explicit opinions, but the very site where response is formed. To colonise the human womb through attentional saturation, permanent notification and the algorithmic anticipation of desires is to colonise subjectivation itself — to secure mastery not of what the subject thinks, but of what it can still will to think.

Silence as an Anthropological Condition of Possibility

The third distinctive contribution is the thesis on silence. None of the thinkers examined explicitly formulates that silence is an anthropological condition of possibility — in the same logical sense as language, relation or temporality. Han defends contemplation and withdrawal, but without making them a structural condition of human freedom. Our paradigm may be the first to formulate explicitly that to destroy silence is to destroy the conditions of formation of the free subject — and to draw from this the political and institutional consequences.

The Politics of Interpellation Milieux

The fourth distinctive contribution is the formulation of a politics of interpellation milieux — a theory of the institutional, juridical and economic conditions within which free human response can be formed and maintained. Rosa remains at the sociological and descriptive level. Stiegler develops a technical pharmacology but without a general theory of milieux. Han produces no political programme. Our paradigm is the only one to articulate explicitly a politics of audibility — a politics of protection of the anthropological conditions of freedom — and to ground it in a coherent fundamental anthropology.

The Civilisational Thesis

The fifth distinctive contribution is the formulation of a civilisational thesis of unprecedented scope and precision:

We are the first civilisation to have organised, at an industrial, continuous and individualised scale, the capture of human capacities for response.

This thesis is stronger than Rosa's diagnosis of acceleration, more precise than Stiegler's diagnosis of proletarianisation, more systematic than Han's aphorisms on fatigue. It names not a symptom but an ecological destruction — the destruction of the anthropological milieux within which the responsive subject can be formed. And it immediately engages a political responsibility of a new kind.

VI. THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME: WHAT REMAINS TO BE BUILT

A paradigm is defined not only by what it has accomplished — but by what it opens. The A²R triad having been formalised, the human womb conceptualised, attentional vulnerability anthropologised and the civilisational thesis established, the research programme can now be formulated with precision. The aim is not to restate what is already acquired, but to identify the fields of work that these acquisitions render possible and necessary.

On the Theoretical Level: Operationalising the Triad

The A²R triad constitutes a general grammar — but a grammar requires syntax. The theoretical work that opens is that of the operationalisation of this grammar: how do the three moments — call, response, resonance — articulate differently according to types of

milieux, ages of life, registers of existence? A more explicit dialogue with philosophy of language — notably Wittgenstein and Austin on the performative dimension of calls — would allow greater precision regarding the internal structure of the call itself. A deeper dialogue with Bergson, Ricœur and Heidegger would allow the development of a theory of the proper temporality of the call — the time required for a call to be received, discerned, and to become response rather than reaction.

On the Clinical Level: A Nosography of Attentional Milieux

The notion of pathological milieu of interpellation having been established, the clinical work is that of its diagnostic formalisation. The task is to construct a nosography of attentional milieux — a rigorous classification of the pathologies produced by different contemporary interpellation regimes, in dialogue with the phenomenological psychopathology of Binswanger, Minkowski and Tatossian. This nosography would allow movement from the general concept of destruction of the human womb to a precise description of its clinical forms — vocational void, attentional dispersion, hyper-reactivity, anaesthesia of resonance. The development of resonance indicators — tools enabling the empirical evaluation of milieux — constitutes an indispensable extension of this clinical work.

On the Methodological Level: Observing and Measuring Milieux

The civilisational thesis having been established conceptually, the question that now imposes itself is that of its verifiability. How can interpellation milieux be observed and measured? What tools — qualitative, quantitative, phenomenological, ethnographic — allow empirical accounts of what the paradigm describes conceptually? The five dimensions of a milieu of interpellation — interpellative density, intensity, legibility of calls, temporality of response, attentional reversibility — constitute axes of observation susceptible to operationalisation. This methodological work is decisive for the institutional credibility of the programme within the human sciences.

On the Political Level: From Diagnosis to Juridical Theory

The formulation of a politics of interpellation milieux having been achieved, the political work is that of its juridicisation. The task is to construct a theory of the right to de-interpellation — the right of the subject not to be exposed to regimes of call incompatible with the formation of a free response — in dialogue with contemporary theories of

fundamental rights. Alongside this, a political economy of interpellation milieux must be developed: how do economic architectures differentially distribute access to the conditions of discernment? What structural inequalities does the algorithmic colonisation of the human womb produce? These questions displace our paradigm toward a new kind of social critique — no longer simply a critique of inequalities of resources or recognition, but a critique of inequalities in the anthropological conditions of freedom.

On the Theological Level: Anthropologising Without Reducing

The paradigm having established the existence of an implicit theology of the subject, the theological work is that of an explicit dialogue with fundamental theology regarding the structure of the divine call in the biblical and contemplative traditions — without reducing anthropology to theology, but showing how our paradigm enables an anthropologically enriched reading of the traditions of spiritual discernment, and reciprocally how these traditions illuminate dimensions of the call that philosophical anthropology leaves in the shadows.

On the Comparative Level: Testing the Limits of the Paradigm

The civilisational thesis having been formulated within a primarily Western framework, the comparative work is that of its intercultural testing. The task is to examine regimes of call in African, Asian and Amerindian traditions — not in order to find the same structure there, but to test the universal scope of the paradigm and honestly identify its possible cultural limits. This work is also an ethical requirement: a paradigm that presents itself as a general anthropology of the human condition cannot remain unilaterally anchored in a single civilisational tradition.

Limits of the Paradigm

This research programme must be accompanied by a lucid acknowledgement of the constitutive limits of the paradigm — not as an admission of weakness, but as a condition of its rigour.

The paradigm does not explain all human suffering. Certain forms of suffering — biological, traumatic, genetic, psychotic, historical, economic — are not reducible to regimes of

interpellation, and to claim otherwise would be both a theoretical error and a clinical violence.

Milieux never totally determine the subject. The paradigm describes conditions of possibility, not mechanical causalities. The freedom of response — even reduced, even besieged — remains an irreducible anthropological reality. It is precisely because it is irreducible that it is worth protecting the conditions in which it can be fully exercised.

The paradigm itself is situated. It emerges in a precise intellectual context — Western, contemporary, philosophically formed by phenomenology — and this situation is a limit as much as a resource. To acknowledge it is the condition for the comparative dialogue to be genuinely fruitful rather than simply expansionist.

CONCLUSION: THE SINGULARITY OF THE PARADIGM

The anthropology of interpellation occupies a singular — perhaps unique — position in the contemporary intellectual landscape. It stands at the intersection of phenomenology, from which it inherits the structure of the call and the priority of reception over constitution; philosophical anthropology, whose project of a general theory of the human condition it pursues; critical theory, whose civilisational diagnosis and political engagement it shares; psychopathology, from which it borrows clinical tools for thinking the pathologies of milieu; political philosophy, whose questions it displaces toward the anthropological conditions of freedom; and the implicit theology of the subject, whose intuitions it anthropologises without reducing or abandoning them.

But its centre is proper and irreducible to any of these traditions:

An anthropology of the conditions of possibility of human response in the age of architectures of capture.

This formulation says everything the paradigm is and everything it aims at. It says that the question is not only who are we? nor even what do we want? but under what conditions can we still will freely, respond deeply, resonate durably?

And it is this question — at once the most ancient and the most urgent — that gives the anthropology of interpellation its reason for being.

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