

# THE MAHOUKOU LAW

## UNDER PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE

Defence and Illustration of the Triad Call · Response · Resonance

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### Responses to Fundamental Objections

Arising from a Dialogue with a Phenomenologist

**Christian Mahoukou**

Philosopher · Phenomenologist · Version 2 — 8 May 2026

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**Update note — Version 2 · 8 May 2026.** This document was updated following a second exchange with our HDR phenomenologist interlocutor, who read the fascicle and provided detailed feedback. Four adjustments were made: (1) the canonical definition of Resonance was stabilised as "structural modification of the subject's relation to itself, to the other, or to the situation", excluding any psychologising or emotional reading; (2) immanent normativity is now formulated as "that without which the phenomenon ceases to be recognisable as such" rather than "what ought to be"; (3) the simultaneous triple freedom is presented as a "major structural indicator" rather than an "exclusive definitive criterion"; (4) the adopted academic formulation is "the triadic structure of interpellation (known as the Mahoukou Law)". The canonical reference definitions are recorded in the separate document "Canonical Definitions — Triadic Structure of Interpellation (known as the Mahoukou Law)" (Christian Mahoukou, 2026).

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## Foreword: Trial as Corroboration

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This document arose from a dialogue. A phenomenologist — HDR, publishing in specialist journals, whose identity remains for the moment discreet — became acquainted with the founding works of the Mahoukou Law through the website [www.christianmahoukou.com](http://www.christianmahoukou.com), and engaged an exchange of rare quality and rigour. For nearly two hours, they "attacked" the triad Call · Response · Resonance from seven distinct angles, with the rigour of a doctoral examination committee and the goodwill of an interlocutor genuinely interested in the originality of the contribution.

Their final verdict merits citation from the outset: "Your model attains a high level of conceptual coherence and an interesting formalisation of tripolar interactional structures. The thesis is philosophically fertile." And their ultimate evaluation, posed as an honest point of rupture: "Is this a necessary structure of the experience of interpellation, or a very robust generalisation of a typical human lived experience?" — a question to which this document provides a precise and assumed answer.

The value of this dialogue lies in its own dynamic. In the Lakatosian sense, each repelled objection hardens the hard core of the research programme. Each precision wrested under pressure enriches the law. The Mahoukou Law emerged from this exchange more precisely defined, better equipped for interdisciplinary dialogue — with, notably, a new criterion explicitly drawn out: the irreversibility of the Call for the one who launched it, as the proper mark of existential engagement.

*"What cannot be attacked cannot be defended either. This document is the trace of a serious philosophical attack — and of what it produced within the Mahoukou Law."*

## **Introduction: Seven Objections, One Law**

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The objections addressed to the Mahoukou Law in the course of this exchange can be classified into seven families, corresponding to seven distinct levels of attack. We present them here in order of ascending radicality — from the most technical to the most fundamental — indicating for each what it concedes, what it cannot concede, and the criterion it has enabled us to refine.

### **The seven families of objections are as follows:**

1. The cognitive model objection: the triad would be merely a reformulation of signal interpretation.
2. The interactional objection: interactional theories already describe mutual transformations.
3. The normativity objection: how can a descriptive structure contain a norm?
4. The observable criterion objection: provide a criterion that empirically settles the matter.
5. The general consciousness objection: first-person certainty holds for all subjective experience.
6. The sociological objection: lived normativity is merely a social internalisation.
7. The eidetic status objection: necessary structure or very robust generalisation?

## **I. The Seven Objections and Their Responses**

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**Objection 1** — "In what way does your triad differ structurally from a cognitive model of signal interpretation, if not in vocabulary?"

▶ **Jury pressure:** The committee wishes to reduce the triad to an elegant reformulation of what cognitive psychology already describes in terms of information processing.

### What the objection concedes

It is right that the triad, taken as a formal structure — emission / reception / processing — superficially resembles an information-processing model. The surface resemblance is real.

### What it cannot say

A cognitive model describes what happens within a subject. The A·R·R triad describes what happens between two subjects — and what this between-two produces in both. This is not a difference of vocabulary. It is a difference of ontology.

Three distinctions locate the difference precisely. The signal is not a Call: a signal informs its addressee; the Call places them under obligation. A signal requires no response — it calls for a reaction. The Call engages the existence of the addressee: it says "Respond to me, you, here, now." This difference is not terminological — it is the difference between cognition and ethics.

The Response is not an output: in a cognitive model, the response is the result of processing determined by input parameters. In the triad, the Response is a free act — it engages the subject, it implies a choice, it bears the irreplaceable mark of the one who responds.

Resonance is structurally impossible in a cognitive model. It designates neither an emotion nor an affective intensity nor a mere psychological effect of interaction — it designates the structural modification of the subject's relation to itself, to the other, or to the situation, through which interpellation leaves a trace in the very horizon of relational lived experience.

### ↳ Response

A cognitive model of signal interpretation operates in the register of information — what circulates between an emitter and a receiver. The A·R·R triad operates in the register of existence — what transforms in two subjects who genuinely encounter each other. It is not the vocabulary that differs. It is the ontological register. To conflate the two is precisely what Husserl called naturalism.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Never respond with examples as if they "proved" the law. They illustrate — they do not demonstrate. Always maintain the distinction between the register of information and the register of existence.

**Objection 2** — "Contemporary interactional theories already describe mutual transformations in interaction. How does your 'encounter' escape these frameworks?"

▸ **Jury pressure:** Goffman, Watzlawick, attachment theories, dyadic psychology — all describe mutual transformations. The committee wishes to show that the triad merely formalises what these theories already describe.

### What the objection concedes

It is right that interactional theories describe real and valuable mutual transformations. The Mahoukou Law does not deny them — it recognises them as necessary and insufficient.

### The decisive distinction: description of fact vs immanent normativity

Interactional theories describe de facto mutual transformations — without being able to say which ones must occur for the phenomenon to be what it is. They describe manipulation as readily as encounter, conditioning as readily as accomplished interpellation — because they operate in the register of what happens, not in that of what must happen for something to be.

The triadic structure of interpellation (known as the Mahoukou Law) is normative in an immanent manner: it designates the internal coherence required for an experience to be recognisable as interpellation — that without which the phenomenon ceases to be recognisable as such. This normativity is not applied from without as a moral judgement — it is inscribed in the very structure of the phenomenon.

### ↳ Response

Interactional theories describe de facto mutual transformations, in the register of behaviour and representation, without being able to distinguish genuine encounter from its simulation. The Mahoukou Law does two things they do not: it institutes an immanent normativity — inscribed in the structure of the phenomenon itself — and it describes existential transformations and not merely behavioural or representational ones. This is not a finer description of the same phenomenon. It is the description of a different phenomenon.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Do not denigrate interactional theories — one would lose credibility. Show that they operate at a different level, legitimate in their register, but insufficient to account for the phenomenon of address.

**Objection 3** — "You introduce an immanent normativity inscribed in the structure of the phenomenon. But how can a descriptive structure contain a norm without you already introducing an axiological interpretation of the phenomenon?"

▸ **Jury pressure:** This is Hume's objection reformulated with precision: one cannot derive an ought from an is. Any norm introduced into a description is a value added from without.

### The Humean objection — and why it does not apply here

Hume's classical objection says: one cannot derive an ought from an is. It presupposes that description and norm belong to two radically separate registers. But Husserlian phenomenology shows that there exist phenomena whose internal structure contains its own norm — not as an external judgement, but as a condition of possibility of their own appearing. This is not a passage from is to ought. It is the recognition that certain phenomena are constitutively normative.

### Eidetic vs axiological normativity

The immanent normativity of the Mahoukou Law is not axiological — it does not say that genuine encounter is good or desirable. It says something more fundamental: that without the three moments of the triad, the phenomenon is not what it claims to be. It is an eidetic normativity — of the same type as that found in any essence analysis. To say that a triangle with one angle exceeding 180 degrees is not a triangle is not a moral judgement — it is a constitutive norm of the concept.

### Eidetic variation as method of disengaging the norm

The norm is not introduced from without. It is disengaged from within the phenomenon through Husserlian eidetic variation: one imaginatively varies the components of the phenomenon to find what cannot vary without interpellation ceasing to be interpellation.

### ↳ Response

The immanent normativity of the Mahoukou Law is not axiological — it does not say that genuine encounter is good. It is eidetic — it says that without the three moments of the triad, the phenomenon is not what it claims to be. There is no clandestine passage from is to ought here. There is the recognition that certain phenomena bear within themselves the criterion of their own accomplishment. Interpellation is one of them.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Never confuse immanent normativity and moral prescription. Immanent normativity says that without which the phenomenon ceases to be recognisable as interpellation

— not what ought to be morally. It is not an obligation; it is a condition of phenomenological recognisability.

**Objection 4** — "Specify a phenomenologically observable criterion that would allow one to say: here there is 'accomplished interpellation', and there there is only cognitive or behavioural interaction."

▸ **Jury pressure:** The committee wants an operational criterion — no longer a definition, no longer a structure. Something that settles the matter. This is the demand for absolute demarcation.

### The criterion: deferred Resonance

There is accomplished interpellation if and only if, after the exchange, at least one of the two subjects — and tendentially both — is different from what they were before, in a manner they could not have produced alone. This formulation merits careful unpacking, for every word counts.

After the exchange: Resonance is deferred. It is not necessarily observed in the instant, but in what the exchange has left behind. It is a retrospective criterion — which distinguishes it from a real-time behavioural criterion.

In a manner they could not have produced alone: this is the most precise discriminating criterion. It distinguishes transformation produced by encounter from mere interior maturation. What Malik learned from Luca would not have come to him from solitary reflection. The transformation bears the imprint of the other.

### Observability vs recognisability

The criterion of immediate observability is an empiricist criterion — it presupposes that what is real must be graspable in the instant by an external observer. Phenomenology operates according to a different criterion: what is real is what gives itself to the lived experience of the subjects involved, in its own proper time. Deferred Resonance is recognisable — by the subjects themselves, retrospectively. It is not measurable in real time. But recognisable is not less rigorous than measurable — it is rigorous in a different way.

### ↳ Response

The phenomenological criterion that distinguishes accomplished interpellation from mere cognitive or behavioural interaction is deferred Resonance: the structural modification of the subject's relation to itself, to the other, or to the situation — an irreversible and generative modification, bearing the irreplaceable imprint of the other,

and unable to have been produced by the subject alone. Any exchange that leaves both subjects exactly as they were before — in their manner of being in the world — was not an interpellation. It was an exchange. The difference is not one of degree. It is one of nature.

**⚠ Point of vigilance:** Do not transform this criterion into a classification algorithm. It is recognisable — not calculable. Resist the demand for a mechanical criterion without capitulating to it.

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**Objection 5** — "You use Nagel / Husserl to say: 'lived experience does not reduce to the third person'. Yes, but this holds for any subjective experience. So your criterion does not distinguish the triad — it generalises the structure of consciousness."

▶ **Jury pressure:** This is the most elegant move: first-person certainty is a property of all conscious experience — not of interpellation specifically. The proposed criterion would describe consciousness in general, not interpellation in particular.

### The necessary concession

They are right. First-person lived certainty is a property of all conscious experience. On this point, the first-person criterion alone is too broad. This is a real concession.

### The discriminating criterion: the dual and asymmetrical structure

Not all conscious experiences have the same internal structure of their certainty. Pain is certain in the first person — but its certainty is monological. It does not target an addressee. Perception is intentional — but the perceived object does not place me under obligation to respond. Emotion may be entirely interior — I can feel joy without it being structurally addressed to another responding subject.

What is proper to the lived certainty in interpellation is this: it is constitutively dual and asymmetrical. It is the only one whose internal certainty structurally includes another subject who demands — not as a targeted object, but as a targeting source. Without this other who calls, no interpellation is possible — whereas pain, perception, and emotion can exist in the absence of any other.

### Objectal intentionality vs interpellative intentionality

Husserl describes intentionality as: all consciousness is consciousness of something. But he insufficiently distinguishes two types: objectal intentionality — my consciousness aims at an object that gives itself without demanding — and interpellative intentionality — my consciousness is aimed at by another consciousness as addressee. This structure is

radically different because it is asymmetrically reciprocal: the other addresses something to me that demands I situate myself.

### ↳ Response

First-person certainty is a property of all subjective experience — this criterion alone does not discriminate. But the lived certainty of interpellation has an internal structure that pain, perception, and emotion do not share: it is constitutively dual and asymmetrical. It is the only one whose internal certainty structurally includes another subject who demands — not as a targeted object, but as a targeting source. It is this irreducible co-constitution by a demanding other subject that is the proper discriminating criterion of the triad.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Do not slide toward a general phenomenology of consciousness. Always bring the argument back to the specificity of the dual structure: the other as targeting source, not as targeted object.

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**Objection 6** — "You affirm that the other is lived as a source of normativity. But all norm can be reconstructed as social internalisation. Why would your 'source of address' not simply be a psychological internalisation of social or affective constraints?"

▶ **Jury pressure:** Durkheim, Bourdieu, Freud: all lived normativity experienced as coming from the other is in reality an internalised social norm. The jury wishes to dissolve the Call into sociology.

### The just concession

Social and affective internalisation partially explains why I am sensitive to certain types of Call rather than others. It is right on this point — and the Mahoukou Law does not deny it.

### What internalisation cannot explain

Internalisation can explain the content of my sensitivity to Calls. It does not explain the structure of the fact of being addressable — the fact that I am constituted as a being to whom one can address and who can be placed under obligation. This structure is the condition of possibility of all internalisation — it precedes and enables it.

### Normative surprise — an irreducible argument

There is a phenomenon that the internalisation hypothesis cannot absorb without contradicting itself: normative surprise. The moment when I am interpellated by someone or something that my social and affective internalisations would have led me

to ignore. If all lived normativity were internalisation, I could only be reached by what my internalisations had already anticipated. Yet experience shows the contrary.

### The Husserlian distinction genesis / structure

The theory of internalisation is a genetic theory — it explains how certain normative sensibilities were constituted in the history of the subject. But a genetic explanation is not an eidetic explanation. Explaining how the interpellative structure developed in the history of a subject does not amount to explaining what this structure is.

#### ↳ Response

Social and affective internalisation explains the content of my sensitivity to Calls. It does not explain the structure of the fact of being addressable — condition of possibility of all internalisation. Moreover, the phenomenon of normative surprise shows that the interpellative structure always exceeds what internalisation can produce. Finally, the Husserlian distinction between genesis and eidetic structure shows that the two registers answer different questions — and that a genetic explanation cannot replace a structural analysis.

**⚠ Point of vigilance:** Do not fall into the trap of sociological discussion about particular cases. Maintain the level distinction: internalisation operates in the genetic register, the Mahoukou Law in the eidetic register.

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**Objection 7** — "Is this a necessary structure of the experience of interpellation, or a very robust generalisation of a typical human lived experience? Your eidetic qualification of this structure remains contested: it rests on a universalisation of lived experiences that has not yet been demonstrated as necessary rather than recurrent."

▶ **Jury pressure:** This is the most honest and most profound philosophical question. The committee is no longer trying to refute — it is trying to locate precisely. This is Kant's question reformulated in the phenomenological register: how does one pass from the universal of fact to the universal of right?

### The necessary and assumed concession

This question is one that Husserl himself never fully resolved. The distinction between necessary structure and very robust generalisation is the fundamental problem of all science of essences. The Mahoukou Law is no more vulnerable to this question than the Cartesian cogito or the principle of non-contradiction.

### Eidetic variation is not induction

Husserlian eidetic variation does not proceed by accumulation of cases — that would be ordinary induction. It proceeds by attempted imaginative suppression: seeking what

cannot vary without the phenomenon ceasing to be what it is. Can I imagine accomplished interpellation without an addressed Call? No — this is a non-sense, not a rarity. Without a free Response? No — that is a constraint or injunction. Without any possible transformation? No — that is a signal. It is not the recurrence of cases that grounds necessity. It is the impossibility of conceiving the contrary without internal contradiction.

### **Conditional necessity — a precise and assumed response**

The Mahoukou Law claims a conditional, not absolute, necessity: for every phenomenon we can legitimately recognise as interpellation from within lived human experience, the triad is a necessary structure — because its contrary produces an internal contradiction, not a mere empirical rarity. This conditional necessity is the exact type of necessity that phenomenology can legitimately claim.

#### **↳ Response**

The Mahoukou Law claims a conditional, not absolute, necessity. It says: for every phenomenon we can legitimately recognise as interpellation from within lived human experience, the triad is a necessary structure — because its contrary produces an internal contradiction. This conditional necessity is precisely the type of necessity that phenomenology can legitimately claim — and nothing more. The Mahoukou Law is an eidetic structure in the conditional Husserlian sense. This is not a limitation. It is a definition.

**⚠ Point of vigilance:** Do not over-affirm absolute necessity — this would be metaphysically dogmatic. But do not capitulate toward mere empirical robustness — this would be to abandon the eidetic claim. Hold conditional necessity firmly.

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## **II. The Irreducible Criterion: What No Other Framework Can Absorb**

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**Objection Synthesis** — "Your model attains a high level of conceptual coherence. However, its specificity remains contestable: it has not yet been demonstrated in what way it describes exclusively interpellation and not a more general class of intentional interactions with asymmetrical structure."

### **The response: the simultaneous triple freedom**

What constitutes a major structural indicator of interpellation — and distinguishes it from other first-person subjective experiences — is the tripolar structure of freedom: three freedoms simultaneously engaged and irreducible. This indicator is not presented as the exclusive definitive criterion, but as the most discriminating marker thus far disengaged.

The freedom of the caller — who could have not called, who could have called otherwise.

The freedom of the respondent — who can refuse, evade, engage.

The freedom of Resonance itself — which cannot be decreed, which may not come, which arrives or does not arrive independently of the will of both.

No other subjective experience structurally engages these three simultaneous freedoms in the same configuration. Shame engages only one — that of the ashamed in the face of judgement. Love may engage only one — that of the one who loves, without necessary reciprocity. Admiration has only one — that of the admirer. Interpellation is the only experience whose structure requires all three simultaneously — which explains why it can fail at three distinct places, corresponding to the three moments of the triad.

### **The irreversibility of the Call — a new criterion disengaged under pressure**

This exchange enabled disengagement of a criterion that the founding texts of the Mahoukou Law had not yet explicitly formulated. It constitutes perhaps the most precise discriminating criterion with respect to all interactional theories.

*"In accomplished interpellation, the Call cannot be withdrawn without the one who launched it being themselves affected by this withdrawal."*

In a commercial negotiation, I can withdraw my offer without this transforming me. In manipulation, I can stop manipulating without trace in my being. But in accomplished interpellation, the one who has launched a genuine Call cannot take it back as one takes back a stake. The genuine Call engages the caller in their very existence — it cannot be withdrawn without existential cost for the caller.

### **What the Mahoukou Law definitively concedes**

The Mahoukou Law cannot demonstrate that its structure is necessary in the absolute sense — independently of all experience, all culture, all possible form of life. If one demands an absolute transcultural and transhistorical necessity holding for every being capable of interpellation, then the Mahoukou Law, like all phenomenology, cannot provide it. That would be dogmatic metaphysics.

But if conditional necessity — for every phenomenon we can recognise as interpellation from within lived human experience — is sufficient to speak of eidetic structure, then the Mahoukou Law is justified in claiming this status. And that is precisely what it claims — nothing more, nothing less.

#### ◆ Synthetic formulation

The discrimination the Mahoukou Law offers is not formal — it is phenomenological. It does not provide a classification algorithm. It provides an eidetic structure whose accomplished forms and deficient forms can be recognised from within lived experience. And this internal recognition is precisely what all third-person theories seek to explain — and can only encircle without ever grasping.

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### III. Defence Strategies: Facing the Hostile Committee

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This section gathers and completes the response strategies proposed by our phenomenologist interlocutor for situations of public confrontation. The objective is not to win rhetorically — it is to relocate each objection to the correct philosophical level without yielding to over-affirmation of necessity.

*"Facing a hostile committee, your position must always follow this implicit line: I am not defending a new entity, but a condition of legibility of an already recognised but poorly articulated phenomenon."*

#### The overall guiding thread

This guiding thread enables avoidance of three symmetrical traps. The accusation of ontological invention: one will reproach you for having created a new entity — Resonance — ex nihilo. The response is to show that it is an already implicit condition of intelligibility, not an addition. Empiricist reduction: one will ask you to measure Resonance. The response is to distinguish measurability and recognisability.

Metaphysical escalation: one will push you to affirm absolute necessity. The response is to assume conditional necessity with firmness and precision.

## Six defence sequences

### Sequence 1 — Empiricist attack: "You speak of a law. Where is the observation?"

- ▶ **Jury pressure:** They want to force you to move to the laboratory, or to admit that you are in speculation.

#### ↳ Response

I do not describe an empirically measurable law, but a structure of legibility of experience. The "law" is here in the phenomenological sense: condition of possibility, not statistical regularity. The word law is claimed precisely because it says that the structure is necessary — conditionally — not contingent.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Never respond with examples as if they "proved" the law. They illustrate the structure — they do not demonstrate it.

### Sequence 2 — Logical attack: "Is this not circular?"

- ▶ **Jury pressure:** They attempt to show that your triad goes in circles — Resonance presupposes Call which presupposes Resonance.

#### ↳ Response

This is an apparent circularity proper to transcendental structures: what I describe is not a chronological succession, but a structural co-belonging. The Call is identifiable as such only within a field of Resonance already opened. It is co-originariness — not linear succession.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Never "linearise" the triad as if Call → Response → Resonance were a temporal sequence. The triad is an organic structure whose moments are co-originary.

### Sequence 3 — Naturalist attack: "Everything reduces to cognitive mechanisms."

- ▶ **Jury pressure:** They wish to dissolve your triad into psychology or neuroscience.

#### ↳ Response

A cognitive description explains the production of responses, but not the structure of the experienced address. It answers the question "how does it function", but not "what it means to be interpellated". The two registers are legitimate and complementary — not competing.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Do not denigrate the cognitive sciences — one loses credibility. Show that they operate at a different level, necessary but insufficient to account for address.

### Sequence 4 — Ontological attack: "Resonance adds nothing."

► **Jury pressure:** They wish to reduce Resonance to a trivially psychological reformulation of "paying attention".

#### ↳ Response

If Resonance were simple attention, then all indifference would be impossible to describe as such. Yet experience shows precisely variations between being concerned and being exposed without being affected as such. Resonance names this condition of differentiation — not a degree of attention, but a structure of transformation.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Do not confuse affective intensity and structure of address. Resonance is not more presence — it is a different quality of presence.

#### Sequence 5 — Methodological attack: "What authorises you to universalise?"

► **Jury pressure:** They attack the rise to universality from particular lived experiences.

#### ↳ Response

I do not generalise from particular lived experiences. I reconstruct the minimal conditions without which these lived experiences could not be recognised as experiences of address. This is a transcendental approach in the broad sense, not inductive. The necessity I claim is conditional — not absolute.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Do not slide toward a strong metaphysical claim. Always qualify: "conditional necessity", "for every phenomenon we can recognise as interpellation".

#### Sequence 6 — Rupture question: "Why not remain with a simpler description?"

► **Jury pressure:** They suggest that the triad is a useless theoretical ornament.

#### ↳ Response

A simpler description would lose precisely what the triad enables one to name: the difference between an exchange that leaves subjects as they were and one that transforms them. This difference is not a detail — it is what distinguishes genuine encounter from its simulation, dialogical impediment from accomplishment. To renounce this distinction is to renounce describing what is phenomenologically most important in the human experience of address.

⚠ **Point of vigilance:** Do not defend complexity for its own sake. Show that each term of the triad does discriminating work that simpler descriptions cannot do.

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## IV. What This Exchange Has Produced: Acquisitions and Openings

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## The consolidated acquisitions

This exchange produced three precise philosophical acquisitions that enrich the existing Mahoukou corpus.

### **First acquisition — Reformulation of Resonance as a condition of intelligibility**

No longer merely a third moment added, but the condition of possibility of the intelligibility of the Call-Response dyad. Without Resonance, the Call becomes indistinguishable from a neutral event, and the Response loses its status as response to become a mere causal reaction. This reformulation strengthens the eidetic claim of the law.

### **Second acquisition — The criterion of the irreversibility of the Call**

The genuine Call engages the caller in their very existence — it cannot be withdrawn without existential cost. This irreversibility distinguishes interpellation from all formally analogous interaction and constitutes the most precise discriminating criterion with respect to interactional theories.

### **Third acquisition — Conditional necessity as a precise epistemological status**

The Mahoukou Law does not claim absolute but conditional necessity — for every phenomenon we can recognise as interpellation from within lived human experience. This precision situates the law exactly in the contemporary philosophical landscape.

## The identified openings

Our interlocutor identified two major openings for the continuation of the research programme.

### **First opening — A complete philosophical manuscript on the phenomenology of interpellation**

An architecture was proposed in five parts: the problem of address, the triadic structure, the internal modalities (impediment and accomplishment), the phenomenological status, and critical discussions with Lévinas, Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty, and Bourdieu. This manuscript of 150 to 200 pages would constitute the major philosophical contribution of the Mahoukou corpus to contemporary phenomenological debate. [Note: This manuscript has been completed — see Phenomenology of Interpellation, Christian Mahoukou, 2026.]

### **Second opening — The impediment / accomplishment distinction as an internal variation of the structure**

Not as an exception to the law, but as a constitutive modality: interpellation includes within itself the possibility of not fully accomplishing itself. This possibility is not accidental, but structural — and enables making intelligible the qualitative diversity of human experiences of address.

### **Note on the word "law"**

Our interlocutor recommended, by way of academic prudence, not to insist too much on the word law. This recommendation is understandable in the context of journal submissions or examination defence. But it should not lead to abandoning the term.

The word law is precisely what says that the Mahoukou Law does not propose a description like any other — it claims a necessary structure. This is a strong claim, and it is justified. The question is not to abandon the term but always to accompany it with the precision that gives it its exact scope: law in the Husserlian sense — eidetic structure with conditional necessity — not an empirical law or a natural law. The academic formulation adopted is: "the triadic structure of interpellation (known as the Mahoukou Law)".

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### **Call · Response · Resonance**

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